

Croatia has renewed and extended the original 12-month mandate seven separate times. While some sort of public order has been maintained and the Yugoslav Army has partially departed, the UNPA's have not been demilitarized. Heavily armed Serbian paramilitary units remain, the local non-Serbian population continues to be expelled and in some cases killed, and it has not been possible for a single displaced person to return to these areas. According to the 1991 census, there were 261,942 non-Serbs in the UNPA's. Since the arrival of UNPROFOR at least 39,000 non-Serbs have been forced to flee, 347 have been killed, 26 women raped, and 1,618 tortured at the hands of the Serbian occupiers. This is an intolerable situation.

With the intransigence of the Serbs to engage in serious discussions of peace, Croatia's mandate renewals have amounted to no less than tacit U.N. support for the indefinite continued Serb occupation of Croatian lands seized by aggression. In real terms, the positive economic contributions of the U.N. presence in the occupied territories have actually provided support for the Serbian occupiers and proven a major hindrance to forcing the Serbs to the negotiating table.

In this light, I ask my colleagues to review Croatia's U.N. Ambassador Nobile's discussion reprinted below about Croatia's refusal to renew the UNPROFOR an eighth time, and invite Members to take a good hard look at some of the causes of the deadlock and suffering which Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have endured for too long. Moreover, my colleagues, this action by the Croatian Government is completely supported by the Croatian people as evidenced by two resolutions by the Croatian Parliament authorizing the Government's decision and a third binding the Government to this course.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1995]

CROATIA'S MOVE TOWARD PEACE

(By Mario Nobile, Croatian Ambassador to the U.N.)

Last month, the Republic of Croatia decided to terminate the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the occupied territories of Croatia. The decision is designed to reinvigorate the negotiating process and to reach a peaceful settlement of the territories, which are internationally-recognized as part of Croatia but illegally occupied by Serbia, with the cooperation of local Serbs.

Contrary to the views held by some, including speculation in The Post's editorial of Jan. 18 ("Another Balkan War?") Croatia did not take this action in order to pursue war with the local Serbs or their patrons in Belgrade. Our objectives are the exact opposite.

The departure of UNPROFOR will shift the total cost of Serbian occupation from the international community to the Belgrade government. The \$1 billion per year cost of maintaining UNPROFOR in Croatia has essentially become an "occupation fee" paid by U.N. member nations, including the United States, which itself contributes about \$300 million.

The presence of UNPROFOR provides the occupying forces with economic sustenance through a continued stream of hard currency, through aid deliveries, through UNPROFOR-paid rents, through fuel brokering, and through infrastructure maintenance and development. UNPROFOR is probably the largest employer in the occupied territories.

Because Serbia is weakened from the effect of international sanctions, it cannot afford to fund both its activities in Bosnia and its

support of Serbs occupying parts of Croatia. That makes it more likely that Serbia's President Milosevic will be compelled to work with the international community and Croatia to reach a negotiated settlement regarding Croatia's occupied territories.

It is clear that UNPROFOR is not a real deterrent to war, in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Croatia were indeed intent on reintegrating its occupied territories by force, it could have done so already.

Croatia is further convinced that solving the problem of its occupied territories first can greatly improve the chances of a settlement in Bosnia along with the lines of the internationally-accepted Contact Group proposals. Here's why: A strong, reintegrated Croatia can better assist the Bosnian government through the Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, thus forging a more effective balance of power in the region.

Additionally, without having to maintain a 15,000-troop presence in Croatia, UNPROFOR can transfer resources to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they are badly needed. U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali has recently called for an additional 7,000 UNPROFOR troops for Bosnia. He is unlikely to meet that need without tapping existing U.N. assets.

There are risks associated with our decision regarding UNPROFOR. But Mr. Milosevic and his dependents in Croatia's occupied territories have used U.N. soldiers as a buffer to reaching an expeditious settlement of a situation which could go unsolved for years to come under the current circumstances. Croatia views such a statement as far more dangerous than taking a pragmatic, albeit dramatic, action that we are confident will result in an accelerated peace in the entire region of southeastern Europe.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT BLOCK GRANTS ACT OF 1995

SPEECH OF

HON. MARTIN R. HOKE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 14, 1995

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 728) to control crime by providing law enforcement block grants.

Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is designed to address the problem of inaccurate reporting of crime statistics.

We all know that many localities do not make crime data gathering a top priority. However, under this bill their financial award will be based on their reported data. I am sure we all agree on the importance of making sure accurate data is used when the Bureau of Justice Assistance calculates awards.

My amendment states that if the director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance believes that the reported rate of violent crimes for a local unit of government is inaccurate, he must investigate the methodology used by the locality to determine the accuracy of the submitted data. If he determines that the submitted data is inaccurate—for whatever reason—he is to use the best comparable data available instead.

The amendment places no additional burden on the localities and gives the director the discretion to determine which cases deserve investigation.

Mr. Chairman, this is a common sense amendment. Local units of government should not benefit financially—at the expense of other localities—for inaccurately reported crime data.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to explain my amendment. I urge its adoption.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 728, AS REPORTED,
OFFERED BY MR. HOKE OF OHIO

Page 18, strike line 23 through "poses" on line 24, and insert the following:

"(c) UNAVAILABILITY AND INACCURACY OF INFORMATION.—

"(1) DATA FOR STATES.—For purposes".

Page 19, after line 4, add the following new paragraph:

"(2) POSSIBLE INACCURACY OF DATA FOR UNITS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT.—In addition to the provisions of paragraph (1), if the Director believes that the reported rate of part 1 violent crimes for a unit of local government is inaccurate, the Director shall—

"(A) investigate the methodology used by such unit to determine the accuracy of the submitted data; and

"(B) when necessary, use the best available comparable data regarding the number of violent crimes for such years for such unit of local government.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. KAREN L. THURMAN

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 16, 1995

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 138 on H.R. 7, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present I would have voted "no."

SUMMARY OF RULES COMMITTEE VOTES

HON. JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 16, 1995

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, on January 4, 1995, the House adopted a new rule, clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI, which requires that committee reports on any bill or other matter include the names of those voting for and against on rollcall votes taken on any amendment and on the motion to report. During consideration of the rule on the first day of the 104th Congress, an explanation included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Chairman SOLOMON states:

It is the intent of this rule to provide for greater accountability for record votes in committees and to make such votes easily available to the public in committee reports. At present, under clause 2(e)(1) of rule XI, the public can only inspect rollcall votes on matters in the offices of the committee. It is anticipated that with the availability of committee reports to the public through electronic form the listing of votes in reports will be more bill-specific than earlier proposals to publish all votes in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD twice a year.

Upon examining the Rules Committee report to accompany House Resolution 44, the rule for House Joint Resolution 1—balanced budget constitutional amendment, I found it lacking